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5	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON	
6	AT TACOMA	
7	ROBERT HILL,	
8	Plaintiff,	CASE NO. C15-5663 BHS
9	v.	ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT THOMAS
10	LUKE WALLIN, et al.,	WHITE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
11	Defendants.	
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13	This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Thomas White's ("Sergeant	
14	White") unopposed motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 7). The Court has considered	
15	the pleadings filed in support of the motion and the remainder of the file and hereby	
16	grants the motion for the reasons stated herein.	
17	I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND	
18	On April 23, 2013, Plaintiff Robert Hill ("Hill") was arrested by Tacoma police	
19	officers. Dkt. 11-1, Declaration of Thomas White ("White Dec."), Ex. 1 at 10–11. At the	
20	time of the arrest, Officers Luke Wallin, Michael Galvin, and Ryan Hovey ("Officer	
21	Hovey") were present. <i>Id.</i> at 6, 10–11. Sergeant White was not at the scene, and did not	
22	have any part in Hill's arrest or booking. White Dec. ¶ 3.	

1 Following the arrest, Officer Hovey prepared an arrest report. White Dec., Ex. 1 at 6. Sergeant White electronically reviewed and approved the report submitted by Officer Hovey. See id.; White Dec. ¶ 4. Sergeant White did not supervise Officer Hovey, but Sergeant White was the sergeant tasked with reviewing the reports in the system when Officer Hovey's report was pending approval. *Id.* ¶¶ 4, 7. When a sergeant reviews a report for approval, the sergeant ensures that the report contains facts to support the crime charged, uses correct spelling and grammar, and has completed all required fields. *Id*.¶ 5. On August 21, 2015, Hill filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against several Tacoma police officers, including Sergeant White. Dkt. 1-2 ("Comp.") ¶ 1.8. Construing Hill's pro se complaint liberally, Hill asserts § 1983 claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution against Sergeant White. *Id.* ¶¶ 5.5, 5.9. On September 24, 2015, Sergeant White moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 7. That same day, Sergeant White informed Hill of the requirements for opposing the summary judgment motion under *Rand* and *Wyatt*. Dkt. 9. Hill did not file a response. II. DISCUSSION Sergeant White moves for summary judgment, arguing that all claims against him should be dismissed with prejudice because he did not personally participate in the events upon which Hill's suit is based. Dkt. 7 at 4. **Summary Judgment Standard A.** Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

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fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party 3 fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 5 323 (1986). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole, 6 could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. *Matsushita Elec*. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party must 8 present specific, significant probative evidence, not simply "some metaphysical doubt"). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists 10 if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 12 U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 13 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 14 The determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close question. The 15 Court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must 16 meet at trial—e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases. *Anderson*, 477 17 U.S. at 254; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The Court must resolve any factual 18 issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party only when the facts specifically 19 attested by that party contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party. The 20 nonmoving party may not merely state that it will discredit the moving party's evidence at trial, in the hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the claim. T.W. 22 Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 (relying on Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Conclusory,

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nonspecific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and missing facts will not be presumed. *Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n*, 497 U.S. 871, 888–89 (1990).

B. Personal Participation

Sergeant White argues that all claims against him should be dismissed because he did not personally participate in the alleged constitutional violations. Dkt. 7 at 4–5. "Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant." *Taylor v. List*, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A person deprives another "of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation." *Johnson v. Duffy*, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). "A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." *Taylor*, 880 F.2d at 1045. "There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983." *Id*.

Based on the evidence in the record, Sergeant White's involvement in this case was limited to electronically approving a report prepared by Officer Hovey, an officer that Sergeant White did not supervise. *See* White Dec. ¶¶ 3, 7. Hill does not submit any evidence showing that Sergeant White personally participated in Hill's arrest and prosecution or knew of the alleged constitutional violations. In the absence of such evidence, the Court grants Sergeant White's motion for summary judgment based on lack of personal participation.

III. ORDER Therefore, it is hereby **ORDERED** that Sergeant White's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 7) is **GRANTED**. The claims against Sergeant White are **DISMISSED** with prejudice. Dated this 16th day of November, 2015. United States District Judge